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Elections, specially in countries such as Brazil with an electorate of the order of 100 million people,
yield large-scale data-sets embodying valuable information on the dynamics through which indi-
viduals influence each other and make choices. In this work we perform an extensive analysis of
data sets available for Brazilian proportional elections of legislators and city councillors throughout
the period 1970-2012, which embraces two distinct political regimes: a military dictatorship and a
democratic phase. Through the distribution P (v) of the number of candidates receiving v votes,
we perform a comparative analysis of different elections in the same calendar and as a function of
time. The distributions P (v) present a scale-free regime with a power-law exponent α which is not
universal and appears to be characteristic of the electorate. Moreover, we observe that α typically
increases with time. We propose a multi-species model consisting in a system of nonlinear differ-
ential equations with stochastic parameters that allows to understand the empirical observations.
We conclude that the power-law exponent α constitutes a measure of the degree of feedback of the
electorate interactions. To know the interactivity of the population is relevant beyond the context
of elections, since a similar feedback may occur in other social contagion processes.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Da, 89.65.-s 89.75.Fb, 87.10.Mn
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades, special attention has sparked
amongst statistical physicists the study of elections [1–5].
An election can be seen as a large scale event that pro-
vides a huge amount of real data about people choices re-
sulting from collective processes. Then, its analysis may
reveal important hints on how people are influenced and
opinions propagate. The number of data is particularly
huge in countries such as Brazil, with a large and diver-
sified electorate. Moreover, differently from the case of
presidential or governor elections, with few candidates,
in an election for legislators or for city councillors, there
is also a large number of candidates, of the order of a few
thousands in the whole country. This provides a wide
spectrum of choices that allow to probe how people pref-
erences distribute.
Plausibly following these motivations, pioneering
works analyzed the Brazilian proportional elections of
1998 [6–10], for federal and state deputies in the most
populated states Sa˜o Paulo and Minas Gerais. It was
first claimed that the probability density function (PDF)
of the number of votes P (v) for deputies presented, as a
common feature, a power law decay P (v) ∼ 1/vα, with
exponent α = 1 [6–12]. Diverse opinion dynamics mod-
els were then proposed to explain such behavior [7–9, 13].
The simple Sznajd dynamics (only agreeing pairs of in-
dividuals can convince their neighbors [4]) appeared to
be enough to explain the power-law exponent α = 1. A
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robust result almost independent of the network proper-
ties [7, 8]. A simple contagion model [13] was also able
to reproduce the 1/v behavior, but the small-world effect
appeared to be crucial in that case.
For Brazilian city councillors, the exponent was found
to be larger than unit [10]. Elections with proportional
rules in other countries were also analyzed, like India [9],
Finland [11] and Italy [14], revealing that the power-
law exponent, or even the power-law itself, was not ro-
bust [14]. As a consequence, it was argued that an essen-
tial feature to capture a universal behavior was to take
into account the role of parties [11, 14, 15]. In fact, it is
sound that a voter chooses first a party, following its ide-
ology, and then the voter chooses a candidate belonging
to that party. Moreover, voters may be influenced by the
fact that the total amount of votes for a party will decide
the corresponding number of seats. However, at least in
the Brazilian elections, several features hamper a mean-
ingful normalization by party: i) electoral choices largely
rely on the personal characteristics of candidates [16] and
although voting for a party is allowed, most people vote
mainly for candidates directly (within an open list sys-
tem), ii) there are over 30 political parties, distributed
in a broad spectrum of orientations [17] but parties oc-
casionally merge together or split and there are also al-
liances, in some cases of mixed political orientation, and
iii) there are no electoral thresholds to disqualify par-
ties with low representativity. Then, we will not tackle
here aspects related to parties. We aim to gain insights
on the formation of preferences of the electorate about
candidates only.
We analyze Brazilian elections for legislators during
the period 1970-2010, for which data are available at
the website of the Brazilian Federal Electoral Court [18].
This period encompasses elections that took place during
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2the civilian governments after 1986, as well as during the
precedent military dictatorship, allowing to investigate
the impact of very different political regimes on vote dis-
tributions. Complementarily, we also consider the elec-
tions for city councillors during 2000-2012. A detailed
description of the electoral context is provided in the Ap-
pendix. After the empirical analysis presented in Sec. II,
we will introduce in Sec. III a model that allows to un-
derstand the features observed in real data analysis. A
comparative study of model and empirical data follows
in Sec. IV, ending by a discussion in Sec. V.
II. VOTE DISTRIBUTIONS
The typical shape of the probability density function
P (v) of the quantity of valid votes received by candidates
is illustrated in Fig. 1, by means of the data of the two
elections for deputies of Rio de Janeiro state in 2010.
Both PDFs display an initial almost flat region, within
statistical fluctuations, and a power-law regime over two
decades, truncated by a rapid decay. That is, relatively
small, intermediate and large numbers of votes show dif-
ferent statistics. Small numbers of votes (up to ∼ 103
from a total of ∼ 107, in the case of the figure) are almost
uniformly distributed, intermediate numbers (approx. in
the range 103 − 105) are scale-free distributed [19] and
very large quantities of votes are outliers, typically cor-
responding to the number of votes received by famous
people or very popular experienced politicians. Actually
they are the election winners! Although the crossover be-
tween the uniform and scale-free regimes, as well as the
exponent α, may change from one case to another, the
profile of P (v) shown in Fig. 1 displays the general form
found for other electoral years and for other states. More-
FIG. 1. Probability density of the quantity of votes P (v)
received by candidates for deputies of Rio de Janeiro state
in 2010. Data are logarithmically binned. In this and other
figures, thin lines are a guide to the eyes. The straight line
with slope -1.45 is drawn for comparison.
over, notice that both PDFs shown in the figure are very
close to each other, specially the scale-free region with
power-law exponents that coincide within error bars [20].
The main difference is in the level of the flat region, indi-
cating a larger fraction of candidates receiving few votes
in the elections for state deputies, which also present a
larger number of candidates (see the Appendix).
For each PDF, the exponent α was obtained by fitting
a power-law to the scale-free region. Figure 2a shows α
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FIG. 2. (a) Exponent α of the PDF of votes P (v) as a func-
tion of the electoral year, from elections for state deputies, in
the four most populated states: Sa˜o Paulo (SP), Minas Gerais
(MG), Rio de Janeiro (RJ) and Bahia (BA). (b) Histogram
of α across all the states for the years indicated on the figure.
(c) Exponent α as a function of time, for both deputies and
whole Brazilian electorate. A non-linear least squares fit was
used to obtain α from the intermediate scale-free region.
3as a function of the electoral year for the state deputies
elections in the four most populated states. The out-
comes for federal deputies in these states, as well as the
results for both deputies in the remaining states, display
similar tendencies. In contrast with the results for Sa˜o
Paulo and Minas Gerais in 1998 [6, 10], the exponent α
typically differs from 1. The histogram of the values of
α obtained for each state is shown in Fig. 2b for the case
of state deputies. A comparison of the values of α as
a function of time for both deputies elections, grouping
the whole Brazilian electorate, is shown in Fig. 2c. No-
tice that, specially in the democratic period, the values of
α for both elections at the same calendar coincide within
error bars [20].
For each state, as well as for the whole Brazilian elec-
torate, one observes that α typically increases with time,
except for the peak at 1986. The two political regimes
clearly have a different impact in the behavior of param-
eter α. A rapid increase with time occurs during the
dictatorship and a slow one during democracy. The vari-
ability of the exponent α cannot be explained simply by
differences in the quantity of votes Nv or of candidates
Nc, although all tend to increase with time. In fact,
for instance, the most notable changes in α with a record
value in 1986, occur in a period of relative stability of the
electorate size. On the other hand, for the full Brazilian
electorate, it is clear in Fig. 2c the proximity of the val-
ues of α for federal and state deputies in the democratic
period, despite the number of candidates Nc differs (see
Appendix), and mainly despite the pools of candidates
are distinct.
For senators, the number of candidates per state is too
small (e.g., only eleven in Rio de Janeiro in 2010) to build
an histogram, however we obtained P (v) for the whole
electorate. P (v) also decays as a power-law, although the
plateau phase is lacking, reflecting the absence of candi-
dates with few votes. In Fig. 3, we compare the PDFs
of votes for senators and deputies for the whole Brazilian
electorate in 2010. Notice the coincidence of the PDFs
in the scale-free region, for the three different elections
with different candidates but the same electorate.
10-10
10-9
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
102 103 104 105 106 107
P(
ν)
ν
Federal Deputies
State Deputies
Senators
FIG. 3. Comparison of the PDFs of votes for deputies and
senators in 2010, for the whole Brazilian electorate. Thin lines
are a guide to the eyes.
The present statistical analysis indicates that: i) α is
not universal, ii) it tends to increase with time, iii) for a
given electorate, it takes a defined value. That is, α seems
to be associated to some property of the electorate or
its interactions, independently of the pool of candidates
and beyond the electorate size. Therefore, the scale-free
regime may reflect a fundamental feature of the complex
collective processes involved.
III. MODEL
Previously proposed models reproduce the 1/v law but
do not allow to describe the PDF decay of the form 1/vα
with generic α that we observe in real data. We propose a
simple model, where we describe the temporal evolution
of the quantity of votes vi(t) received by each candidate i
as a continuous variable. This is justified by the fact that
the fractions vi/Nv tend to assume continuous values in
the limit of a very large number of voters. In analogy
to multi-species models of population dynamics, we con-
sider that the number of voters for candidate i, hence
the quantity of votes vi, follows a logistic-like growth dy-
namics. Then, the time evolution is governed by a set of
ordinary differential equations of the form
dvi
dt
= ri(vi + c)
γfi ({vj}) , (1)
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Nc, where ri, c and γ are positive param-
eters, and 0 ≤ fi ≤ 1 limits the quantity of votes.
Randomness is a realistic ingredient of social dynam-
ics, relative both to individual attitudes and to social
influences [1]. Then, one should consider in principle the
equation parameters as stochastic variables to reflect the
heterogeneity of the electorate and its interactions. How-
ever, for simplicity, we will assume heterogeneity in the
parameters where it is more crucial, as discussed below.
The coefficient ri represents a kind of fitness of candi-
date i. It is related to the capacity of persuasion deter-
mined by a set of attributes attached to the candidate,
such as its political proposal or personal appeal. A neg-
ative value would lead to a vanishing fraction of votes.
Then, for the candidates that win votes, the parameter ri
should take positive values. We consider that the popu-
lation of candidates is heterogeneous with respect to this
parameter, according to a given PDF Pr(r). A similar
kind of heterogeneity has been assumed in the cellular
automata of Ref. [8], where the probability of convincing
is different for each candidate in a first stage where only
candidates can influence voters.
The propagation of opinions about candidates is a sort
of branching or multiplicative process [6, 10], in which
a supporter of a given candidate can persuade, with a
given probability, a fraction of its neighbors, and each
one of them in turn can influence others. In the stan-
dard case, the intrinsic rate of growth per capita of the
number of votes vi is constant, given by ri. However, if
there were a positive feedback between individuals, the
4rate per capita would increase with vi, which can be de-
scribed by γ > 1. A similar idea of self-reinforcing mech-
anisms, that can lead to herding behavior, have already
been considered in the context of financial bubbles [21].
But avalanches of opinion propagation can occur in other
contexts too [22]. The “better connected” is the elec-
torate, the larger γ. This does not mean higher mean
connectivity or higher probability of contagion, but that
the probability of contagion becomes larger as the num-
ber of followers increases. A negative feedback may also
occur and is represented by γ < 1. It is true that one
could associate a different γ to each candidate, reflect-
ing the particular feedback of the community in which
the candidate exerts influence. However, we will consider
that γ is predominantly homogeneous across a given elec-
torate.
The introduction of parameter c allows to contemplate
the existence of two realistic regimes, as considered in
a previous model of elections [8]. In an initial phase
when vi  c, candidates influence voters either directly
or through their staff, independently of the number of fol-
lowers of each candidate. Otherwise, when the number
of followers becomes large enough, people interact and
become influenced by other electors too. Then c can be
related to the spreading which is independent of the num-
ber of followers vi, and may also include the effect of the
media through which a candidate can spread its influence
and gain voters. This parameter could be in principle a
random parameter, different for each candidate, but also
in this case we will take it as homogeneous.
Finally, we consider a logistic factor of the general form
fi({vi}) = 1− vi
βiNv
−
∑
j 6=i βijvj
Nv
, (2)
that assumes that each quantity of votes vi follows a
logistic growth, up to a maximum value βiNv, with
0 < βi ≤ 1, corresponding to the portion of the elec-
torate a candidate would conquer in the absence of other
candidates. The last term is responsible for coupling
the equations and describes the inter-specific competi-
tion amongst candidates in their struggle for conquering
voters, where βij measures the competitive effect of can-
didate j on candidate i. In modeling voting processes,
it is commonly considered as a more realistic situation,
that when the election occurs the opinion dynamics has
not necessarily attained yet the steady state [8]. Then,
as soon as the logistic term affects only the long-time
dynamics, for simplicity, we consider that βij = βi = 1,
∀i, j.
Besides randomness in the equation parameters, an-
other source of variability may reside in the initial distri-
bution of votes v0i ≡ vi(0). It is clear that there are can-
didates with a political history and hence may start with
a given community of followers, then, it would be inter-
esting to investigate realistic initial distributions. How-
ever, if the initial numbers of votes are relatively small,
as expected for the majority of the candidates, their pre-
cise values will not affect the distribution at later times,
at least for vi  1. Then we will set v0i = 1 for all can-
didate i, corresponding to the minimal value of its own
vote.
Summarizing the model description, under the above
assumptions, the evolution equations are reduced to the
simple form
dvi
dt
= ri(vi + c)
γ
(
1−
∑
j
vj/Nv
)
, (3)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ Nc, where γ and c are positive constants and
ri is the only random parameter. We assume that it is
uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. (Notice that introducing a
different maximal value of r will be equivalent to rescal-
ing the time, then we chose the unit interval.) That is,
the model depends on only two parameters that appear
to be the most relevant ones. From the numerical inte-
gration of this set of differential equations, we obtained
P (v). We considered the values of vi at the steady state,
however the results of the model are not significantly af-
fected if we do not wait for the steady state to be reached.
As illustrated in Fig. 4, the model produces outcomes
qualitatively similar to the empirical ones, with a flat re-
gion and a power-law decay. Notice however that the last
phase of rapid decay of the distribution is not present. In
fact, as discussed above, very popular candidates gaining
very large numbers of votes are those contributing to the
cutoff, but they are not contemplated by our model in
its present form, which assumes a uniform distribution
of r. This could be readily improved by modifying P (r),
to take into account people with outstanding fitness, but
we are interested here in the free-scale regime.
FIG. 4. P (v) from model simulations of the set of Eqs. (3),
with γ = 1.3 and ri uniformly distributed in the real interval
[0, 1], for different values of c indicated on the figure, with
Nv = 10
7 and Nc = 10
3, in a single realization. The initial
condition was vi(0) = 1 for all i, and P (v) was computed
from the values of vi at the final steady state. The thick lines
correspond to the theoretical prediction given by Eq. (5). For
c = 0 the pure power-law 1/v1.3 arises.
A pictorial representation of the model is given in
Fig. 5. It illustrates the two mechanisms of dissemination
5of ideas of a candidate i: i) without participation of the
electorate, for low vi compared to c the propaganda of the
candidate dominates the diffusion process, and ii) when
the number of followers vi is large enough, the phase of in-
teractivity of the electorate occurs with feedback (γ 6= 1)
or without it (γ = 1). The (positive) feedback is rep-
resented in the picture by thicker lines. In the measure
than the number of followers of a candidate grows, the
probability or rate per capita of convincing the nearest
neighbors in the network of contacts also increases. The
scale free regime is associated precisely to this interactive
phase. Actually, there is a third regime, when the num-
ber of undecided people becomes small (
∑
vi(t) ∼ Nv,
hence the factor fi tends to zero), a phase of competition
between candidates operates, that is not represented in
the picture.
FIG. 5. Pictorial representation of the model. A candidate
gains followers by means of either its interaction (or that of its
staff) with the electorate or by means of a cooperative inter-
action of the electors. The arrows indicate contagion of ideas
in time (evolving radially outwards). The figure illustrates
the case of positive feedback: the probability of contagion in-
creases (represented by thicker arrows) as the population of
followers increases.
The distribution P (v) resulting from the model can
be analytically evaluated. At sufficiently short times the
evolution of Ni will not feel the competition term and the
equations are uncoupled. This corresponds to an initial
phase in which voters interact mainly with candidates
in its network of influence. As a first approximation,
integrating Eq. (3) with fi = 1 for all i, we have
vi(t) ' vi0
(
1− (γ − 1)ri t vγ−1i0
)−1/(γ−1)
. (4)
This approximate expression is expected to hold up to a
time close to the upper threshold given by the condition∑
vi(t) = Nv (fi = 0). Eq. (4) provides the dependence
between the random variables v and r that allows to find
the relation between their PDFs, by equating P (v)dv =
Pr(r)dr. In particular, let us consider that r is uniformly
distributed in the interval [0, 1]. In this case, we obtain
that the distribution of v(t) is
P (v) =
N
(c+ v)γ
, (5)
for 1 ≤ v ≤ vmax, where the normalization factor is
N ' (γ − 1)(c+ 1)γ−1. In fact this approximate expres-
sion is in good accord with the results of the numerical
integration of the model (see Fig. 4). It also satisfactorily
describes real distributions, with only two parameters c
and γ, which control the crossover, between the plateau
and the scale-free regimes, and the power-law decay, re-
spectively. Then Eq. (5) allows to identify the fitting
exponent α with the intrinsic exponent γ, furnishing a di-
rect interpretation for the origin of the scale-free regime.
Namely, the exponent α ≡ γ can be associated to the
degree of feedback of the spreading processes.
IV. COMPARISONS WITH REAL DATA
Let us first analyze size effects. In all the empirical
cases the electorate size, measured by Nv, is very large
compared to the number of candidates Nc. Within the
realistic range in which Nv  Nc holds, the effect of
an increase of Nv on the PDF of votes (not shown) is
to extend the power law range, as soon as larger values
of v become possible. As a consequence, the flat level
decreases to preserve the norm. This is the same effect
observed in real data (Figs. 1 and 3). The power law
range also increases if Nc decreases (as illustrated by the
cases of deputies in Fig. 3).
In Fig. 6, we show a comparison of the model outcomes
with results for state deputies and senators (whole elec-
torate) in 2010. We used γ = 1.2, that corresponds to
the average value, across states, in that year (from the
distribution shown in Fig. 2b), and we run 26 samples
with the empirical values of Nc and Nv for each state.
The case of state deputies is shown in Fig. 6a. A very
good accord of the PDF from simulations with that of
real data is observed. The value of α from fits allows to
recover the intrinsic value γ = 1.2. In general, simula-
tions fail in describing the initial portion, which is not
completely flat. This could be improved by using a re-
alistic initial distribution of votes, instead of vi0 = 1 for
all i. Because, although this condition does not affect
the distribution of large values of v, it does affect the
distribution of v ∼ 1.
The case of senators is shown in Fig. 6b. A small
number of candidates, together with a very large value
of c, needed to fit the data in that case, may distort
the intrinsic value (γ) of the scale-free regime, yielding
α < γ = 1.2, as shown in Fig. 6b. This may explain
the apparently smaller value of α, compared to those of
deputies, observed in the case of senators (Fig. 3), with
few candidates per state.
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FIG. 6. Comparison of the PDFs from model simulations
and real data, for state deputies (a) and senators (b), with
grouped data for the whole country in 2010. Simulations were
performed with γ = 1.2, that corresponds to the average value
in Fig. 2b, c = 300 (a) and c = 4×104 (b). In both simulations
we grouped 26 samples with the values of Nv and Nc of each
state, as done for the real data. The initial condition was
vi(0) = 1 for all i. The dashed lines with slope -1.2 are drawn
for comparison.
Let us consider now the PDFs for city councillors.
These PDFs also present the same characteristic shape
shown for legislators, but with a larger value of the ex-
ponent α, as already known [10]. Following our model,
this exponent might be related to the connectedness or
feedback characteristic of each electorate, the electorate
of each city in this case. If this were true, the same ex-
ponent should be observed in other vote distributions for
the same electorate. To test this hypothesis, we com-
pared distinct elections in the same city. In order to do
that, we restricted the analysis done for legislators to the
electorate of each city considered. Because of the better
statistics, we analyzed only state capital cities. The re-
sults for Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo cities are presented
in Fig. 7. Recall that elections for city councillors and
deputies occur on alternate even years. The exponent α
for both deputies coincides within error bars [20]. Notice
that although the candidates are different, the points rep-
resenting the exponent α for deputies and city councillors
exhibit a continuity, belonging almost to a same curve.
This reinforces the idea that this exponent is associated
to a feature of the electorate and its interactions.
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FIG. 7. Exponent α of the P (v) for candidates to deputies
(in a given city) and city councillors, as a function of time:
Rio de Janeiro city (a) and Sa˜o Paulo city (b). The exponent
for deputies in the remaining of the electorate of the state, out
of the capital (denoted “other”) is also shown for comparison.
We also plotted for comparison the exponent for the re-
mainder of the electorate in each state. It displays lower
values close to those of the whole state electorate, pre-
sented in Fig. 2. It is also remarkable that the values of
α for large urban conglomerates are larger than those for
the population of the corresponding state out of the cap-
ital city, consistent with the larger interactivity expected
for an urban population.
V. DISCUSSION
We analyzed the distributions of votes P (v) for differ-
ent Brazilian elections along the years of 1970-2012. P (v)
typically presents a flat region followed by a power-law
decay. The crossover between them may change as well as
the power-law exponent, from one case to another. How-
ever, the responses of the same electorate (from a given
capital city or state) to distinct elections with a different
pool of candidates, present very similar exponent α (as
observed in Figs. 1, 2c, 3 and 7), suggesting that this
exponent reflects a feature that is predominantly char-
acteristic of the electorate. Another noticeable feature
is the tendency of this exponent to increase with time.
7This tendency occurs not only for global data but also
for the data restricted to each state or city, as shown in
Fig. 2.
We introduced a new model of opinion formation in
elections, very different from previous ones, which con-
sists in a Nc-dimensional nonlinear dynamical system,
similar to multi-species models of population dynamics.
Stochasticity was introduced through the fitness param-
eter r. The model is validated by its ability in describing
the features of the empirical distribution of votes and
could be useful to tackle other questions related to elec-
toral processes as well.
Under the light of our model, the variability of α ap-
pears to be a reflection of the variability of the mech-
anisms through which voters interact. Namely, the ex-
ponent reflects the degree of feedback of the population.
This explains why the values of α coincide for the same
electorate and are larger for urban centers, with higher
interactivity than rural areas. It is also noticeable that
typically α is larger than one for the democratic regime,
indicating a positive feedback of the electorate.
Contrarily, during the dictatorship, lower than one or
even almost null values of α are observed. According to
the model, they can be associated to negative feedback
(α < 1) and absence of interaction of the electorate (large
c), respectively. Both are consistent with a dictatorial
regime imposing severe restrictions to social interactivity,
generating distrust and negative feedback. In the mea-
sure that some of the restrictions to democracy gradually
relaxed towards the end of the military regime, the in-
crease of α is observed. Concerning the record value of α
in 1986, it may be related to diverse factors that favored
the participation of a large and active electorate. Besides
marking the end of the military period, in this opportu-
nity the legislators responsible for the elaboration of a
new Constitution (the 1988 Constitution) were to be cho-
sen. It is remarkable that the singular historical context
could in fact have promoted a particularly high positive
feedback in the Brazilian electorate. Besides the intrinsic
features discussed above as responsible for a lower value
of α, another factor that may contribute to underesti-
mate the value of α is a low number of candidates, as
already observed for senators. In fact, candidatures and
electoral choices were initially small and increased during
the transition from bipartidism to pluripartidism.
The increase of α in the last two decades, during the
democratic phase, is consistent with the fact that the way
people interact is changing. The number of people access-
ing Internet has increased in that period and, mainly in
the last decade, the number of people connected to social
networks (such as, Orkut, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) has
increased too. Moreover, people may participate in more
than one of these platforms and members may belong to
groups of interest. These groups of people holding com-
mon interests may propitiate a rapid consensus among
their participants and a positive feedback.
Our model could still be improved to be more real-
istic, for instance, by modifying the distributions of r
and/or of the initial distribution of votes v0. But, even
in its present form, it captures the more relevant ingredi-
ents and it is able to model real data. In particular, the
model allow to relate the scale-free regime to the degree
of feedback in the electorate interactivity. The changes
of α with time and the larger values of α observed for
urban centers are consistent with this view. It is remark-
able that election statistics furnishes a measure, through
the effective parameter α, of the population interactivity
feedback which rules the propagation of electoral pref-
erences. This measure could be taken into account to
design campaign strategies according to the electorate
mood. But it may be useful also in other contexts since it
reflects a property of the population interactivity, which
governs the propagation of opinions and influences.
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APPENDIX: ABOUT THE DATA
We analyzed the nominal votes of the elections for
different kinds of legislators in Brazil (senators, federal
deputies and state deputies) and also city councillors.
Senators and federal deputies are congressmen, repre-
sentatives of a given state (from a total of 26 States in
the federation and a federal district), in the senate and
in the chamber of deputies of the national Congress, re-
spectively. While federal deputies are in proportion to
the population of the respective State, there is a fixed
number of senators for any State (3 per State, hence a
total of 81, including the federal district). State deputies
are local representatives elected to serve in the unicam-
eral legislature of each state. All deputies serve during
a four-year term, while senators serve during eight-year
terms, being renewed one-third and two-thirds of the sen-
ate in alternate electoral calendars. All these elections
occur simultaneously in the same countrywide electoral
event, together with the election for president and gov-
ernors, at four-year intervals. From a pool of candidates
in each state, an elector can choose one name of each
class (two senators, instead of one, in the years when
two-thirds are renewed).
Councillors serve during four-year terms in each city
council and are voted in the same municipal election in
which voters chose mayors, every four years, in even years
alternating with presidential elections.
In the proportional elections here considered, besides
the possibility of voting on a candidate (nominal vote),
a citizen can vote directly on a party (the so called “leg-
enda” vote), without specifying a particular candidate.
Actually, only a minority of the electorate practices this
possibility (4-18%). Let us also mention that absten-
tion, invalid votes and blank votes are all ignored in vote
8counting for proportional seat allocation purposes.
We scrutinized the distribution of votes for candidates
(nominal votes) only. That is, blank, invalid votes, as
well as, valid legenda votes were not taken into account,
following our aim of gaining insights on the formation of
opinions about candidates.
Electoral sizes are shown in Fig. 8. The quantity of
(valid nominal) votes, Nv, and the number of candidates,
Nc, for deputies and senators of all the states together vs
the electoral year are plotted.
The electorate gradually increased, faster than the
population, after the establishment in 1985 of the vol-
untary voting for illiterate and minors between sixteen
and eighteen years of age.
Both kinds of deputies are voted in the same elec-
toral event and only one name can be indicated by each
voter, then the respective total number of voters (hence
of votes) Nv are very close. The same occurs for senators,
except that two names, instead of one, can be elected in
alternate calendars when two-thirds of the senate is re-
newed, hence the quantity of votes is about twice the
quantity of votes for deputies in those occasions.
The total of candidates Nc for the state legislatures
is always larger than for the national one, reflecting the
larger number of total seats to be assigned. The num-
ber of candidatures for senators is still smaller, not only
because the number of seats is smaller but also because
senators must meet more requirements for eligibility. The
number of candidates was lower during the military dicta-
torship due to the several restrictions, increased after the
restoration of pluripartidism in 1980 and attained a rela-
tive stabilization at a higher level after 1986. The number
of parties Np is also represented, evincing the period of
bipartidism during the dictatorship and the progressive
reintroduction of the multiparty system.
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FIG. 8. Quantity of valid nominal votes Nv, number of can-
didates Nc and number of parties Np for state (hollow) and
federal (filled symbols) deputies, and for senators (half-filled
symbols), as a function of the electoral year. Data for all the
Brazilian states were accumulated, including the federal dis-
trict of Brasilia for senators. Data for 1994 were unavailable.
[1] C. Castellano, S. Fortunato, V. Loreto, Rev. Mod. Phys.
81, 591 (2009).
[2] S. Galam, Sociophysics: A Physicist’s Modeling of
Psycho-political Phenomena (Springer, Berlin, 2012).
[3] S. Galam, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 19, 409 (2008).
[4] K. Sznajd-Weron, Acta Phys. Pol. B 36, 2537 (2005).
[5] N. A. M. Arau´jo, J. S. Andrade Jr, H. J. Herrmann, PLos
ONE 5(9): e12446 (2010).
[6] R. N. Costa Filho, M. P. Almeida, J. S. Andrade Jr., J.
E. Moreira, Phys. Rev. E 60, 1067 (1999).
[7] A. T. Bernardes, U. M. S. Costa, A. D. Araujo, D. Stauf-
fer, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 12, 159 (2001).
[8] A. T. Bernardes, D. Stauffer, J. Kerte´sz, Eur. Phys. J. B
25, 123 (2002).
[9] M. C. Gonza´lez, A. O. Sousa, H. J. Herrmann, Int. J.
Mod. Phys. C 15, 45 (2004).
[10] M. L. Lyra, U. M. S. Costa, R. N. Costa Filho, J. S.
Andrade, Europhys. Lett. 62, 131 (2003).
[11] L. E. Araripe, R. N. Costa Filho, Physica A 388, 4167
(2009).
[12] F. S. Vannucchi, C. P. C. Prado, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C
20, 979 (2009).
[13] G. Travieso, L. F. Costa, Phys. Rev. E 74, 036112 (2006).
[14] S. Fortunato, C. Castellano, Phys. Rev. Lett. 99, 138701
(2007).
[15] A. Chatterjee, M. Mitrovic, S. Fortunato, Sci. Rep. 3,
1049 (2013)
[16] http://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/
3765/000392513.pdf?sequence=1
[17] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_
parties_in_Brazil
[18] http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/estatisticas/
repositorio-de-dados-eleitorais
[19] A. -L. Baraba´si, http://barabasilab.com/
networksciencebook
[20] Actually errors are larger than the bars in the figures,
because these include only the error in the fitting param-
eter due to data fluctuations but do not include the error
associated to the selection of the fitting interval.
[21] D. Sornette, J.V. Andersen, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 13, 171
(2002).
[22] D.J. Watts, PNAS 99 5766 (2002); A. V. Goltsev, S.
N. Dorogovtsev, and J. F. F. Mendes, Phys. Rev. E 73,
056101 (2006).
